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Abstract
 This article argues that Thailand made use of gold issues to hedge the risks of 
incorporating into the yen bloc, so as to ensure a smooth economic transition in the 
beginning of the Pacific War. This hedging strategy can be divided into two stages: First, 
Thailand released mixed information in Bangkok and Tokyo negotiations in the first half of 
1942, and behaved more inclined to adopt the gold standard rather than the yen standard. 
Therefore, Thailand could request for more side payments because of Japan?s concerns. 
Second, after it changed to yen standard, Thailand still urged for gold acquirement, so as to 
hedge the future risks of yen, and maintained potential relations with the Anglo-American 
currency area.
 These negotiations basically set out the principles of Thailand?s economic policy towards 
Imperial Japan during the whole Pacific War, and also helped to maintain Thai currency 
stability and economic stability.
 During the Pacific War, Thailand maintained relationship with two competitive currency 
blocs simultaneously, and refuse? to completely cut off currency relations with either of 
them. By this hedging strategy, Thailand could get benefits and compromise from both 
sides, and avoided the risks of completely leaning to either side. It also indicates that weak 
countries can flexibly use economic tools to deal with their relations with stronger powers. 
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1. Introduction
 After the outbreak of European war in 1939, Japan aspired to incorporate the Nanpo Area (?
?? ) into the East Asia self-sufficient sphere (????? ) (?? 1963?p.151). Compared with 
other states, it is noteworthy that Thailand successfully maintained a considerable degree of 
independence during the whole Pacific War. 
 The alliance with Japan and the declaration of war on the Allies helped to maintain Thailand?s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity on the whole (Swan 1989, p.313; ?? 2015?pp.365-366). And 
it meant Thailand?s substantial transition from integration in the Anglo-American bloc toward 
integration in the Japanese bloc. However, despite the alliance, Thailand still had to work to protect 
its economic survival from excessive demands or overexploitation at the hands of the Japanese. 
From January to June in 1942, Thailand?s urgent economic problems were the massive loss of 
dollar, pound reserves and access to western markets, as well as Japan?s requirement for a sharp 
depreciation of the baht, so as to coincide with Japan?s ?Greater East Asia Financial Sphere (??
???? )? policy. Then from July 1942, Thailand was obliged to provide huge military loans as an 
ally, but these war-induced economic problems, such as serious inflation and economic stagnation, 
created widespread resentment and poverty among the general population. 
 So at the beginning of the Pacific War, Thai leaders tried to consider other measures to gain 
additional leverage or bargaining power against the Japanese empire in this asymmetric alliance, 
so as to protect its economy as much as possible (Reynolds 1994, p.114). This article aims to argue 
that Thailand made use of gold issues to hedge the risks of incorporating into the yen bloc, so as to 
ensure a smooth economic transition in the beginning of the Pacific War.
2. Literature Review
 Which strategy did Thailand use to cope with Japan?s excessive demands on economic aspect? 
First, some studies argue that Thailand tried to maintain its independence in dealing with economic 
affairs, which aimed to assure that Thai-Japanese economic relations were mediated on a relatively 
equal basis between the two governments. Peter G. Warr and Bhanupong Nidhiprabha stress that 
Thailand firmly opposed the inclusion of Japanese advisors into the Thai National Banking Bureau, 
which protected Thailand?s autonomy in financial affairs (Warr 1996, p.10). In addition, William L. 
Swan argues that ?the Thais could keep track of their financial affairs thus allowing them to pursue 
active policies to remedy their economic and monetary problems brought on by the war? (Swan 
1989, p.326), which ensured Thailand?s control over its financial affairs (  1974, p.371).
 Second, some studies argue that the Thailand government regarded the stability of bilateral 
military alliance as a bargaining chip, and actively held talks with Japan and demanded for more 
economic concessions. Some crucial ?pro-Japanese? politicians, especially the Prime Minister 
Phibun and Minister of Finance Wanit, have played an important role in these talks. (Kasetsiri 
1974, p.25). E. Bruce Reynolds says that Phibun emphasized that Japan?s excessive economic 
demands would undermine the Thai-Japanese alliance, and ?his political position was less solid 
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than it appeared on the surface?, thus it was necessary for Japan to make some concessions so 
as to maintain Phibun administration (Reynolds 1994, p.130). Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian argues 
that Thailand demanded that Japan changed its unfavorable policy toward Thailand, otherwise it 
would affect the Thai-Japanese alliance and Thailand?s military loans to Japan (  1989, p.56). 
In addition, Nishino Junjiro points out that Wanit ?resisted stubbornly the unfavorable exchange 
rate agreement till the end? (?? 1978?p.128). Wanit emphasized that the Japanese government 
should consider the livelihood of Thai people, or it would damage Thai domestic support for Thai-
Japanese alliance. These actions of Thai leaders showed that ?they endeavored to alleviate the bad 
results? caused by Japan?s economic exploitations ( , 1974, p.1).
 Third, some studies begin to focus on use of financial and monetary policy tools. Murashima Eiji 
explores the details of Japanese-Thai economic talks since late 1942, and he argues that Thailand 
requested economic compensation from Japan when negotiating the amount and additional 
conditions of military loans every half year, so as to maximize Thailand?s national benefits from the 
alliance (?? 1992?p.62). He stresses the importance of baht loans in Thai-Japanese economic 
relations. In addition, the Thai National Banking Bureau (and later Bank of Thailand) also played 
an important role in ?maintaining the monetary stability? and ?controlling the inflow of Japanese 
yen? (Bangkok Post, 1973.6.28). And it also took some measures to prevent the entry and 
circulation of baht banknotes printed by Japanese Army, so as to maintain its control of its currency 
( , 1972, p.19).
 The existing studies clearly analyze some strategies that Thailand used to cope with Japan?s 
excessive demands on economic aspect. However, as an important part of Japan-Thailand economic 
relations in the beginning of Pacific War, the details of economic negotiations in Bangkok and 
Tokyo in the first half of 1942 and Thailand?s negotiating strategies have not been fully studied. 
These negotiations basically set out the principles of Thailand?s economic policy towards Imperial 
Japan during the whole Pacific War. Therefore, it is necessary to study the details of these two 
negotiations and further explore the negotiating tools and chips of the Thailand government. 
 By using Japanese and Thai literatures, this article finds that gold issues were the main topics in 
these negotiations, and have played an important role in Thailand?s economic policy towards Japan. 
Thailand used the gold standard to wrestle with Japan and behaved more inclined to adopt the 
gold standard rather than the yen standard, so as to request for more side payments and hedge the 
risk of incorporating into the yen bloc. Through these negotiations, Thailand acquired a currency 
stabilization loan, a more favorable trade agreement and an agreement on gold shipments (??? ) 
to Bangkok. And by this hedging strategy, Thailand maintained relationship with two competitive 
currency blocs simultaneously, and refused to completely cut off currency relations with either 
of them. Thailand could get benefits and compromise from both sides, and avoided the risks of 
completely leaning to either side.
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3. Thailand?s Currency Re-construction and Release of Mixed Information
3.1 Yen Bloc and Thai?s Choice for Currency Re-construction
 After entering the Second World War, ?a pattern of blocs and linkages formed the basis for the 
wartime economy?, and many states adopted a strict foreign exchange management policy, which 
featured some kind of ?inconvertibility? (Drummond 1987, p.53; Kirshner 1995, p.174). The bloc 
system was usually based on the currency of the dominant state, and other currencies would legally 
link to this ?standard currency? and use it as the ultimate means of settlement in international 
transactions. In this process, the fighting for "master currency? (???? ) was also very crucial, 
which helped to ensure the exclusive possession of markets and raw material resources (????? 
1989?p.24). In Japan?s colonial history, there was also a yen-aggression process accompanied with 
the military aggression (?? 1989). And it also reflected some relationship of political dominance 
(????? 1942?pp.66-67).
 In 1941, Japan embarked on the road to break off economic relations with Europe and America 
because of the trade and assets freezes. It was urgent for Japan to ?establish a yen-centric Great 
East Asia Financial Sphere and maintain stable linked exchange rates between yen and other 
currencies in this sphere? (??? 1983?pp.604-606). In order to press forward with this plan, the 
Bank of Japan Act was announced in February 1942, thus promoting reforms of the BOJ and then 
formed a Greater East Asia Central Bank (????? 1963?p.440??????? 1969?p.147). 
In December 28th, 1941, the Office Outline of Exchange Rate Measures (?????????
? ) also stated that ?all currencies? exchange rates should be expressed by yen, and the Japanese 
government will directly determine the exchange rates between yen and other currencies ?(???
? 1948?p.614). It forced related states to take the principle of yen-payment (?????? ) and 
yen-standard.
 After the breakout of Pacific War, Thailand?s importance to Japanese economy has dramatically 
increased. Many strategic materials such as gum, tin and rice were imported from Thailand or 
transported through Thailand to Japan. However, business could no longer be conducted using 
the pound as had previously been the norm. Japan needed to borrow Thai baht to pay for military 
expenditures (?? 1992?p.32). Therefore, Japan considered it essential to fully enmesh Thailand 
in the new financial order, so as to facilitate the procurement of military expenditures. In addition, 
Japan also regarded it as an important opportunity to pull Thailand out of the financial influence of 
Britain and America.
 The turning point of this issue was January 25th, 1942. Thailand formally declared war on the 
United States and Britain, which resulted in the freezing of all Thai reserves deposited in these 
two countries (Swan 1989, p.328; ????1943?p.52). Thailand lost over 65% of its currency 
reserves in Britain and America, and it was impossible to maintain the previous pound standard 
system (  1994, p.105). Therefore, it was necessary to restructure its currency system, 
especially the reserve system, so as to restore the credit of the baht. Interestingly, however, 
Thailand did not choose to peg the baht to the Japanese yen, but instead restored the gold standard 
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system. The Ordinance of the Ministry of Finance in February 1942 provided that one baht was 
equivalent to 0.32639 grams of gold (?????? 1942?p.72).
 It seems that Japan?s expansive financial reforms left Thailand with a small amount of control 
over its own finances. However, the Thai government found solutions to fend off Japan?s control. 
It mainly used the gold standard as a hedging strategy to wrestle with Japan, and behaved more 
inclined to adopt the gold standard rather than the yen standard from January to June in 1942. 
In other words, Thailand remained militarily dependent on Japan during this time, but tried to 
retain its economic relations with some gold-dominated states. And it would be very sensitive and 
unacceptable for Japan during wartime. Therefore, Thailand could request for more side payments 
and compensations because of Japan?s deep concerns. 
3.2 Gold Standard and Thailand?s Release of Mixed Information
 How did this hedging strategy work? According to Schelling?s concept of ?rocking the boat? 
(Schelling 1979, p.196), mid-sized powers in the system tend to rock the boat to draw the attention 
of the dominant states. But they actually do not want to overturn the boat or ?destroy the system, 
and only extort side payments: that it, rewards for promising not to rock the boat anymore? (Kirshner 
1995, 172). Therefore, the standard currency is an easy target for upsetting the system in order to 
implement this tactic. The middle states will rock the boat and threaten to select another standard 
currency, so as to improve their bargaining power against dominant states and further realize their 
goals.
 Furthermore, ?even currency areas with asymmetric rules that are led by great powers create 
not so much currency dependence as currency interdependence.? And the dominant states may 
also ?depend on other states to sustain the system for insulation from the larger currency world? 
(Cooper 2006, p.164). Under some conditions, these mid-sized powers can possess more ?bargaining 
power than leaders with respect to particular issues? (Cooper 2006, p.165). Therefore, the yen bloc 
itself also gave Thailand the chance to exert its influence. Thailand maintained relationship with two 
competitive currency blocs simultaneously, and refused to completely cut off currency relations with 
any of them.
 Although it was said that leading Thai politicians were ?obsessed with traditional economic 
theories and orthodox methods towards financial issues, and really wanted to restore the gold 
standard system? during that time(?? 1942?pp.16-17), Japan felt worried by this significant 
policy option, and viewed it as a sign of betrayal, which meant that Thailand ?retained the possibility 
of returning to the sterling or dollar bloc in the future? (?? 1942?p.3). In addition, all other 
currencies in Greater East Asia had already pegged with the yen at a one-to-one relationship, thus 
the exception of Thai baht would inhibit the smooth goods exchanges within the Co-prosperity 
Sphere. Therefore, in order to establish Japan?s currency hegemony, it was necessary to continue 
struggling with the gold-dominated states (????? ) in the region (?? 1942?p.3).
 As mentioned before, Thailand used gold standard as a hedging strategy to deal with its relations 
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with Japan, so as to reduce uncertainty and avoid risks. In this process, the most important thing was 
to release mixed information. By the announcement of pegging to gold in early February, Thailand 
successfully released mixed information of allying with Japan and remaining financial linkages with 
western countries. However, Thailand did not want to challenge or undermine Japan?s yen order 
since it was contrary to Thailand?s bandwagon strategy toward Japan in military and political affairs. 
In early 1942, Thailand still had many expectations for this alliance, and tried to meet the demands 
of the Japanese side. Instead of saying that Thailand would like to restore the gold standard system 
and impair the yen order, it would be better to regard it as a method to steadily separate from the 
former sterling-standard system (?? 1989?p.358????1943?p.6). Therefore, Thailand did 
not choose to peg to the yen immediately, but sought for help it needed through negotiations with 
Japan on standard currency. As such, Ambassador Tsubogami Teiji began to hold intensive talks 
with the Thai Prime Minister Phibun on economic issues. In the so-called ?Japan-Thailand economic 
cooperation?(?????? ), currency and gold issues were very crucial (?????1942.03.26).
4. Thai-Japanese Economic Negotiations and Hedging the Risk of Yen Bloc
4.1 Bangkok Negotiations and Hedging the Risk of Yen Bloc
 The Thai-Japanese Economic Negotiations were both held in Bangkok and Tokyo. The Japanese 
government informed the Thai embassy of the basic principles of economic negotiations in January 
30th, 1942. It emphasizes three points: ?Japan rejects Thailand?s request for gold; baht should be 
linked to yen, and the ratio is one to one; it?s necessary to establish the Thai Central Bank quickly 
and incorporate influential Japanese advisors in it?(?????? 1942?pp.3-6). It reflects that 
Japan was very concerned about gold issues and Thai currency reconstruction. After that, Thailand?s 
announcement on gold standard on February 1st further exacerbated Japan?s worries that gold 
would slowly change the nature of Thailand?s economy.
 The economic negotiations in Bangkok started from February 12th. Japanese Consul-General 
Uchiyama, Clerk Matsuda and Fujisawa held several talks with Wanit at Thai Economy Ministry 
(?????? 1942?p.18). During these negotiations, Thailand mainly strived for three side 
payments, which were important for economic stability during wartime. These side payments 
consisted of  a currency stabilization loan, a bilateral trade agreement and an agreement on gold 
shipments to Bangkok in return for the special yen (?? 1942?pp.10-11??? 1970?pp.638-640). 
The currency stabilization loan and gold shipment would supplement the specie assets and help to 
stabilize the price of commodities. In addition, with Thailand?s increasing dependence on Japan, 
a formal trade agreement became increasingly necessary to guarantee Thailand?s exports and 
imports with Japan. Because the baht needed to be devalued nearly 20% to be equivalent with the 
yen, Thailand also hoped to increase the price of export products (especially rice) and prevent price 
increases of import products from Japan (????????? 1942?p.94). In short, Thailand needed 
assistance from Japan in order to alleviate the negative impacts of separating from Anglo-American 
influence. 
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 In Bangkok negotiations, the most crucial issue was currency standard or exchange rate. If baht 
could not be pegged to yen by 1:1, Japan would spend more money on materials purchasing in 
Thailand, and also left a possibility for Britain and America to interfere Thailand?s financial affairs. 
Therefore, the representatives of both sides decided to hand over the exchange rate issue directly 
to Prime Minister Phibun and Ambassador Tsubogami. And in order to meet Thailand?s demand 
for gold, Japan also made concessions and proposed to provide earmarked gold instead of gold 
shipment.  But it had to be incorporated in Secret Agreement and not open to the public.
 On exchange rate issue, Prime Minister Phibun chose to use delaying tactics and did not give an 
accurate answer to Japanese delegates. Phibun promised that the revision of exchange rate would 
be enforced ?within one month? on March 3rd, but he soon changed it to ?an reasonable time? on 
March 20th (?????? 1942?p.32). This tactic aimed to force Japan to hold serious negotiations 
with Thailand on trade issues, so as to acquire Thailand?s commitment on exchange rate. Japanese 
representatives felt nervous by Thailand?s ambiguous attitude, so it urged the Japanese government 
several times to clarify the framework of trade agreement with Thailand (?????? 1942?p.33). 
Then the Japanese Government replied the basic principles of trade agreement on March 28th and 
requested the exchange rate be amended by April 1st.
 After that, Ambassador Tsubogami and Thai vice Foreign Minister Wichit held several talks on 
specific terms of trade agreement. On March 30th, Tsubogami and Wichit reached a preliminary 
consensus and signed the memorandum. The main contents included:
? ?(1) Japan should purchase 20,000 tons of gum, 7,000 tons of tin, 7,000 tons of teak from 
Thailand in 1942.
??(2) The exchange rate should be amended to 100 baht: 100 yen before April 22nd.
? ?(3) Tsubogami will come back to Japan on April 4th, in order to mediate Wanit?s Economic 
Mission to Tokyo.
? ?(4) If Thai Mission and the Japanese side reach a consensus on the terms of trade agreement 
before April 22nd, the exchange rate should be immediately amended from that day ( ?????
? 1942?pp.37-38).
 After this memorandum, the Bangkok negotiations came to an end. During these two months, 
Japan always urged Thailand to give up the baht-gold peg and revised to link with yen by 1:1 ratio. 
Thailand made use of Japan?s anxious and urgent mentality, and then coerced Japan to make 
compromise on providing loans, earmarked gold and a more favorable trade agreement. In addition, 
Japan had to continue negotiating with Thai Mission in Tokyo on trade issues, so as to ensure a 
formal agreement on exchange rate as soon as possible.
4.2 Tokyo Negotiations and Hedging the Risk of Yen Bloc
 The Wanit Pananon delegation arrived at Tokyo in April 4th, 1942, and the ?negotiations had not 
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progressed as quickly and as smoothly as it seems had been expected? (Swan 1989, p.333). Japan 
still concentrated on the yen-baht agreement and persuaded Thailand into adopting a yen-standard 
system. However, Wanit stressed the necessity to ?create an effective wartime economy which 
would be for the mutual good? (Swan 1989, p.332), which implied that Thailand sought for the help 
it needed, especially the three ?side payments? mentioned above (Bangkok Times 1942.04.21, p.1). 
At the same time, Japan was still worried that the gold standard system would bring many changes 
to Thailand?s domestic economy, while retaining the Anglo-American financial influence in Thailand 
(?? 1942?p.17). 
 As the Thai delegation clearly understood Japan?s negotiating goals, so it took a relatively 
proactive negotiating policy. On April 9th, Thai economic mission presented a draft of trade 
agreement to Japanese delegation, which required Japan to meet Thailand?s three requests within 
one year:
??(1) The Japanese government should purchase Thai rice at the price of baht 8.30 per picul.
? ?(2) The Japanese government should import 20,000 metric tons of rubber, 7,000 metric tons 
each of tin and teak produced in Thailand.
? ?(3) The Japanese government should export goods for Thai civil use, amounting in total to 
about 60 million yen  (  1 1942, p.12).
 Furthermore, Thai delegates pointed out ?the trade agreement should not only concerned trade 
between Japan and Thailand, and Thailand should be able to continue freely trading with other 
territories besides Japan?(  1 1942, p.13). And it also claimed for a substantial increase in rice 
prices and the quantity of goods received from Japan (  1 1942, p.43). Therefore, Thailand quickly 
raised its requests to 35,000 tons of rubber, 14,000 tons of tin, and 20,000 tons of teak. Consequently, 
in the Agreed Items (???? ) signed on April 21st, the Japanese government agreed to continue 
negotiations for a formal trade agreement (?????????p.432). The import price of Thai 
rice had been raised to 9.60 baht per picul as Thailand wished. And the import figure of rubber had 
also been raised to 30,000 ton, but the figures of tin and teak stayed at 7,000 ton(  1 1942, p.43). 
In return, Thailand finally made an oral statement that ?the exchange rates between yen and baht 
shall be fixed at par and put into effect from April 22nd. And both governments will immediately take 
such measures as may be necessary to put into practice the above exchange rate as from the day 
mentioned above? (  1 1942, p.44).
 However, the financial relations between Japan and Thailand remained to be further strengthened, 
because yen had not yet been included in Thai currency reserves. Therefore, Thai delegation was 
still likely to seek for a more favorable trade agreement. Thailand continued to stress that ?if the 
proposed formula is not satisfactory, Thai government will consider another formula? (  2 1942, 
p.105). Then on June 27th, the Understanding on Trade (Draft, Confidential) provided that ?both 
countries shall endeavor to avoid unreasonable rise of the export prices of its own products to be 
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exported to the other?, which greatly reduced Thailand?s concerns about the price fluctuations of 
trade products (  3 1942, pp.187-189). In addition, Japan also made great concessions on energy 
issues, and agreed to provide 7,950 kiloliters of mineral oil to Thailand. In return, Thailand formally 
incorporated yen into Thailand?s currency reserves on June 18th, which meant that Thailand had 
officially adopted a yen standard system ( , pp.143-148 ; ???? 1943a?p.5). As 
exchange rate and trade issues had been basically solved, the Loan Agreement of 200 million yen 
was also accomplished on June 18th (?????? 1942?pp.92-94). It meant that Thailand had 
basically completed the task of currency stability and economic stability.
 After the negotiations, Wanit regarded it as establishing a Thai-Japanese ?monetary axis? within 
the Greater Asian Financial Sphere, which would greatly enhance Thailand?s status in the new 
economic order dominated by Japan (Bangkok Times 1942.06.19, pp.1-3; Swan, p.336). Indeed, with 
its clever use of gold issues, Thailand changed its position in economic negotiations with Japan, and 
ensured a smooth transition in the beginning of Pacific War.
  
4.3 Earmarked Gold and Hedging the Risk of Yen Bloc
 Although the currency standard or exchange rate issue has been solved and Thailand decided 
to adopt the yen standard, it did not mean that the influence of gold issues completely disappeared. 
Thailand still did not want to be completely incorporated into the yen bloc, for the yen bloc had a 
new risk.
 As the Japanese victory tide began to decline by the end of 1942, the credit of yen was also faced 
with severe challenges. Thailand feared that if Japan failed in the war, these payments made by 
special yen would become worthless, so Thailand urged for more methods of payment in addition to 
special yen. 
 During the Pacific war, Japanese military expenditures in Thailand were all paid by baht. As 
Japan did not have enough baht on hand, it had to borrow necessary baht assets from Thailand 
government. These loans would be repaid by gold at first, but it was out of step with Japan?s plan to 
establish the Greater East Asian Financial System, which meant Japan had to divert specie assets to 
foreign settlements. Later they reached an agreement on special yen payment so as to eliminate the 
need for using foreign exchanges or gold to meet overseas debts ( , 1998). However, the 
considerable Japanese military expenditures coupled with huge Thai budget deficits, resulted in a 
huge increase in money supply and inflation (  1994, p.105). 
 ?Gold is hidden behind the international currency credit.? No matter how the banknotes and 
bills of exchange develop, gold reserves are still necessary (? 1986?p.224). With the increasing 
issuance of baht, Thailand hoped to increase its gold reserves and enhance citizens? confidence in 
baht. Therefore, Thailand negotiated with Japan to strive for the ?half amount payment by gold?1 
(????? ) mechanism, so as to hedge the risks of yen bloc. Then it gradually formed a loan 
repayment pattern of special yen plus earmarked gold plus gold shipment.2 And even if Japan failed 
in the war, Thailand would still be able to maintain the acquisition of the earmarked gold, which 
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could help to ensure its financial stability after the war.  (?? 1970?p.270). 
 Japan?s gold settlements with Thailand during wartime were as follows:
 From the table above, Thailand successfully acquired nearly 45 tons of earmarked gold (worth 
224.61 million yen) and 5.893 tons of gold (worth 29.618 million yen) by shipments. And it did help 
to protect the baht?s value from excessive inflation. In addition, gold issues once again became a 
major topic in economic negotiations between Japan and Thailand. In the following three years, the 
two governments negotiated the payment mode of military loans and gold issues every half year. If 
the negotiations stalled, it would directly affect Japan?s military expenditures and military operations 
in Thailand and the whole of Southeast Asia. Therefore, it formed an effective coercive power 
against the Japanese government, and Thailand seized this opportunity to claim more favorable 
conditions and compensations in bilateral negotiations. For example, Thailand urged for more 
machineries and technologies form Japan, and demanded that Japan should help Thailand become a 
self-supporting industrial center (  1989, p.56 ).
5. Conclusion
 This article argues that Thailand made use of gold issues to hedge the risks of incorporating 
into the yen bloc in the beginning of the Pacific War. And this hedging strategy can be divided into 
two stages: First, Thailand released mixed information in Bangkok and Tokyo negotiations, and 
behaved more inclined to adopt the gold standard rather than the yen standard. Therefore, Thailand 
could request for more side payments because of Japan?s concerns. Second, after it changed to yen 
standard, Thailand still urged for gold acquirement, so as to prevent the future risks of yen, and 
maintained potential relations with the Anglo-American currency area.
 These negotiations in 1942 basically set out the principles of Thailand?s economic policy towards 
Imperial Japan during the whole Pacific War, and also helped to maintain Thai currency stability and 
economic stability.
Table 1 Japan?s Gold Settlements with Thailand during Wartime
Earmarked Gold Gold Shipment(??? )
Gold Amount
(kilogram)
Price
(thousand yen)
Gold Amount
(kilogram)
Price
(thousand yen)
1941 11,606 55,968 4,311 20,933
1942 11,424 55,462 ? ?
1943 6,042 29,000 ? ?
1944 11,440 60,000 ? ?
1945 4,325 25,000 1,672 8,686
Total 44,838 224,610 5,893 29,618
Source: ?????????????1984???????????????????396??
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 During the Pacific War, Thailand maintained relationship with two competitive currency blocs 
simultaneously, and refused to completely cut off currency relations with either of them. By this 
hedging strategy, Thailand could get benefits and compromise from both sides, and avoided the 
risks of completely leaning to either side. It also indicates that weak countries can flexibly use 
economic tools to deal with their relations with stronger powers.
?Received 31th October, 2017?
 ?Accepted 29th January, 2018?
Note
1  Half amount payment by gold (????? ) means that half of the total settlement will be made by gold.
2  Earmarked gold means that the gold would not be shipped to Thailand but deposited as Thailand?s property 
in Thai Financial Ministry?s account in the Yokohama Specie Bank?s Tokyo branch.
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